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STATEMENT OF,JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. £ 78-2-2(3){j). and in accordance with Rule 9(e)(9) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court hasjurisdietion to review judgments and
orders entered by the Utah district courts.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE
Did the district court err in granting Appellee/Defendant 4Life Research's ("4Life")
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, treated as a motion for summary judgment, by
concluding that Appellant/Plaintiff Nu-Med USA's ("Nu-Med") claims against 41. ifc were
barred b\ Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as compulsory counterclaims that
were required to be litigated, if at all. in prior litigation between the parties, and rejecting
Nu-Med's position that the claims had previously been voluntarily dismissed in the prior
litigation without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, thereby allowing Nu-Med to re-file the claims. (Issue Preserved at R. 39-41. 114-
123. 289).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary judgment is a legal one
and will be reviewed for correctness. Salt I.ake Citv v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp.. 913 P.2d
731. 733 (Utah 1995); Lopez v. Union Pac. R.R.. 932 P.2d 60! (Utah 1997) ("We review
the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, "ranting them no deference"}.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS1
Rule 13(a). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall stale as a
counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader
has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subjee.-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for
its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (I) at the time the
action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action,
or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other
process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal
judgment on thai claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under
this Rule 13.
Rule 41. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
# * *
(a)(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of
dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subdivision oflhis rule, an action may
only be dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on order of the court based
either on:
(a)(2)(I) a stipulation of all of the parties who have
appeared in the action; or
(a)(2)(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court
1 The determinative provisions set forth herein are taken from the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The issue in this appeal involves prior litigation between the parties which took place
in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, ant: thus, there may be some question
as to whether the issue on appeal should be governed by the federal or state versions of Rules 13
and 41. Nu-Med submits that the substantial similarity of the determinative provisions between
the federal Rules 13 and 41 and the corresponding rules in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
eliminates any need to distinguish between the federal and stale rules. Specifically, the
applicable provisions from Rule 13 in both the federal rule and the Utah rule appear to be
identical. With respect to Rule 41, there are some minor differences between the state rule and
the federal rule, but all of the applicable provisions are substantively the same. Therefore, for
purposes of this Brief. Nu-Med will simply rely on the language stated in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded bv a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion
to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the
defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain
pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph is without prejudice.
%• + ^
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-partyclaim. The
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to
Paragraph (1) of Subdi\ ision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
pleading is served or. if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at
the trial or hearing.
STATEMENT OF CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves business related claims filed by Nu-Med against 4Life alleging that
4Life tortiousK' interfered with a contract between Nu-Med and an individual named Paul
I 'Irich. Nu-Med and 4Life are both network marketing companies who rely on an extensive
network of distributors to sell a variety of health related products. While Nu-Med and 4Life
arc competing in the same industry, they are based out of different states, and likely had little.
if anv. direct dealings prior to early 2002. In Januan' of 2002. however. Paul Ulrich and
4I.ife ended a business relationship that had been going on for several years, and shortly
thereafter, in February 2002. Ulrich and Nu-Med reached an agreement whereby Ulrich
would begin working for Nu-Med.
At about the same time that Ulrich besian working for Nu-Med. 4Life filed a lawsuit
against Ulrich and two of his children alleging various contract and criminal type claims
against Ulrich. Shortly thereafter. 4Life dismissed that initial lawsuit and filed a second
lawsuit against Ulrich and Nu-Med in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah. Nu-Med responded to that suit with several counterclaims alleging that 4Eife was
tortiouslv interfering with the new business relationship between Nu-Med and Ulrich, and
that 4Life was abusing the legal process because it had absolutely no basis for bringing
claims against Nu-Med. The trial judge in that case ultimately agreed that4Lifehadno basis
for bringing claims agt.inst Nu-Med. and dismissed 4Life"s claims against Nu-Med on
summary judgment. At 'hat point. Nu-Med elected, with the court's approval, to voluntarily
dismiss its counterclaims against 4Life without prejudice, while the claims between Ulrich
and 4Life proceeded on in litigation and ultimately to trial.
Nu-Med subsequently elected to re-file its prior claims, which had been voluntarily
dismissed withoutprejudice, by initialing the present case against 4I.ife. Specifically, Nu-
Med's claims in this case include a tortious interference claim based on 4Life,s interference
with the contract between Ulrich and Nu-Med, and claims that 4Li fe abused the legal process
and acted in bad faith when it dragged Nu-Med into the prior legal dispute between Ulrich
and 4Life without any basis for bringing claims against Nu-Med.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Nu-Med commenced the present lawsuit with the filing of its Complaint and Jury
Demand against 4Eife on July 13, 2005. (R. 1-14) 4Life responded with its Answer on or
about August 16.2003. (R. 18-26) After some limited initial discover). 4Lifeillcda Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings on or about January 6. 2006. wherein 4l.ife arsued that Nu-
Med's claims should be dismissed as "compuisor> counterclaims'" which were required to
be litigated, ifat all. in the prior litigation between the parties where Nu-Med had volumarilv
dismissed the claims. (R. 39-1 13)
Alter briclmg by both parties. 4Lite"s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings came
before the trial court for oral argument on April I7. 2006. (R. 289) On that same date, after
the conclusion ol the hearing, the trial court issued a written Minute Entr\ wherein the court
indicated that it was treating 4I.ife's motion as a Motion for Summan Judgment, and that
it was granting the Motion. (R. 266-268) On May 1. 2006. the trial court entered the final
()rder granting 4Life's Motion for Sum map." Judgment, and dismissing Nu-Med's Complaint
with prejudice. (R. 269-2" 1)
Nu-Med Hied its Notice of Appeal on Ma> 25. 2006. (R. 274-275)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
'I he parties in this case. Nu-Med and 4I.ife. arc both network marketing businesses
who use a network of distributors throughout the United States and other countries to sell
\arious health related products. (R. 2. 18-19) Nu-Med is based out of Florida, and 4Life is
based in Salt 1 ake Count). ( R. 1-2. 1S i
At some point prior to the \ear 2000. 4I.ife had hired an individual by the name of
Paul I 'lrich {"[ 'Inch") to work as an independent contractor and consultant for the purpose
of expanding, training and maintaining 4I.ife's network of distributors. ( R. 2, 19) Ulrich was
rccogni/ed b\ 4I.ilc as an individual with knowledge and experience in the network
marketing industry ard someone who had experience in developing, training and
maintaining distributor networks and network compensation plans. (R. 2, 19) from the time
that he was hired until J.inuaiy of 2002. 111 rich had a positive impact on 4Life's network ol~
distributors, and 4Lile reaped financial benefits as a result of Ulrich's abililv to expand,
develop and improve 4 Life's network of distributors. (R. 2„ 19)
On or about Janu.iry 3 1. 2002. 41 iLc and I Mrich mutually agreed lo end their business
relationship. (R. 2. 19) After the termination of the business relationship between 1'Inch and
4Lilc. Ulrich informed 4I.ife that he intended lo pursue a new business opportunitv with
Nu-Med. another network marketing company. (R. 3. 19) Short!} thereafter, in Februarv
2002. alter 4Lile and Ulrich had terminated their business relationship. Nu-Med retained
Ulrich as an independent contractor for the purpose of assisting Nu-Med in revisintz its
existing network marketing compensation plan, creating marketing materials, and otherwise
assisting Nu-Med with efforts to develop, improve, and exp.ind the network marketing side
of its business. (R. 3. 1 -))
On or about I'ebruan 26. 2002. 4Life initiated a lawsuit against I 'Inch and two of his
children. Anne Oak in and Timotlu 1'lrich. in the I hi ited States District Court for the District
o\' Utah in a case captioned as 4Life Research, /..('. v Paul Ulrich, ct al. Case No.
2:02-CV-I67 (the "First Law suit"). (R. 140-149) In that First I. aw suit. 41. ife aliened claims
of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty fraud, conversion, conspiracy, and unjust
enrichment against Ulrich and his children. (R. 140-149) In response to the First I awsuit.
I 'Inch moved to dismiss 4 Life's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure
to state a claim for which relief ma\ be granted, and on April IS. 2002. 4Life \ohintariK
dismissed the I irst Lawsuit. (R. 5. 20)
Approximatch two daws before dismissing the First Eawsuit, however, on or about
April 16. 2002. 4Life Filed another lawsuit in the I anted States District Court for the District
of Utah entitled 4Life Research. L.C. v. Paul I Irich. ct ui. Case No. 2:02-CV-()3 12 (the
"Second 1 awsuit"). (R. 6. 2D. 151-163) In this Second Lawsuit, in addition to bringing
claims auainst Ulrich. 4I.ife also initiated claims against Nu-Med. including claims for
business defamation, intentional interference with business relations, preliminary and
permanent injunction, and eonspirae>. tR. 6. 2d. 1M-163)
()n or about June 17. 2002. Nu-Med responded to 41 .ife's Second Lawsuit by asserting
several counterclaims against 41. ife. includingcounterclaims of intentional interference with
economic contractual relations between Nu-Med and Ulrich. abuse of process, wrongful
briniiinti of civil proceedings, and bad faith. (R. 60-82) Ulrich also responded to 4Life's
Second Lawsuit with his own separate counterclaims against 41.ife. including claims that
41 itchaddctamed Ulrich. and that 41.ifc had tortiousK interfered with the contract between
Nu-Med and Ulrich. (R. 7, 21)
Durimzthe course ofdisco\cr\ in the Second Lawsuit. 4Life voluntarily dismissed its
business defamation cl.iim against Nu-Med. and on Januan' 7. 2003, the United States
District Court granted summan judgment in favor of Nu-Med. therehv dismissing all oi
4! Tic's remaining claims against Nu-MLD as a matter of law. (R. 6-7. 21) During the
extended multi-day pre-.rial conference where Nu-Med's motion forsummurv judgment was
taken under consideration. Judge Bruce Jenkins asked Nu-Med's counsel whether Nu-.Med
intended to pursue its counterclaims against 41.ife if the court were to dismiss 41.ife": s
remaining claims against Nu-Med on summarv judgment. (R. 46, 86) After discussing this
issue with his clients. Nu-Med's counsel informed Judge Jenkins that if the court were I
.tc to
dismiss 41.ife's remaining claims against Nu-Med on summary |udgment. then Nu-Med
would be willing to voluntarily dismiss its counterclaims "withoutprejudice ", but that Nu-
Mcd intended to pursue its counterclaims against 4Life if the court allowed 4I.ife's cla: s ims
against Nu-Med lo go forward. (R. 89-90) Based upon this response to the court7s inquiry.
when the court issued its written order granting Nu-Med's motion for summary judgment and
dismissing 4Eife's remaining claims against Nu-Med, the court's Summary Judgment Order
also included the following provisions:
Based upon Nu-Med's in court representation that its
Counterclaim against Plaintiff44,ife may be dismissed without
prejudice, the Court further rules as follows;
I f IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Counterclaim of
Nu-Med against Plaintiff 4-Life ma\ be voluatariK withdrawn
and dismissed without prejudice.
R. 92-94) The court's Summarv Judgment Order served to terminate all remaining claims
between Nu-Med and4Lile in the Second Lawsuit. (R. 92-94} There were, however, other
remaining claims and counterclaims running soleK between 41.ife and I 'Irieh that continued
k^n in litigation, and were eventualK tried to a jur\. with Ulrich ultimatclv pre\ ailing on at
least some of his counterclaims, including his defamation and tortious interference claims.
i R. 7. 21) Nu-Med. however, was not a part} to the ongoing litigation, and did not
participate in an\ wa\ in the trial in the Second Lawsuit or a subsequent appeal. (R. 7*. 2 1)
On or about Julv 15. 2005. Nu-Med initiated the present lawsuit against 4Life. (R.
1-14] Nu-Med acknowledges for purposes of this appeal that its claims in this lawsuit are
substantial 1\ similar to Nu-Med7s prior claims against 4Life in the Second Lawsuit which
were voluntanlv dismissed u77//o?/c^v;/7/<7/7v after 41 .ife's remaining claims against Nu-Med
had all been dismissed on summan judgment. (R. 1-14)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Nu-Med contends that trial court erred when it dismissed Nu-Med's claims in this case
on summan. judgment after concluding that Nu-Med's claims were barred b> the
"compulsorv counterclaim" requirements of Rule 13( a) of the I hah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Specifically. Nu-Med claims that the trial court's ruling was erroneous because it ignored the
plain language of Rule 41 which expressly permits a parl\. withcourt approval, to voluntarily
dismiss "an\" counterclaim u ithout prejudice, thereby resening the right to re-tile those
claims at a later date. Nu-Med claims that is precisely what it did in this case.
Nu-Mcd also claims that the trial court's ruling was erroneous because Nu-Med fully
complied with the rcquiiemenls of Rule 13(a) b> originally stating its claims as counterclaims
in the prior litigation, and fully pursuing those claims up until the point where thev ceased
to be "counter" claims because 41.ife's claims against Nu-Med were dismissed on summarv
judgment. There is nothing in Rule 13(a) which required Nu-Med lo continue pursuing its
claims in the prior litigation even after 4Eifc's claims against Nu-Med were dismissed.
Instead, the plain language of Rules 13 and 4 1. when read together, clearlv shows that Nu-
Med had the right lo voluntarily dismiss its claims in the prior case, and then re-file those
claims in the present litigation.
ARGUMENT
I. The Trial (-oilrt Erred In Concluding That Nu-Med's
Claims Are Barred By Rule 13.
'I his appeal presents a purely legal issue wherein the Court will need to evaluate the
relationship and a potential conflict between Rules 13 and 4' of the Rules of Civil Procedure
in order to determine whether Nu-Med should be permitted to pursue claims against 41.ife
which were prc\ iously raised and then voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice, in prior
litigation between the p.irtics. Nu-Mcd contends lhat the trial court erred when it dismissed
Nu-Med's claims by es.'-entially concluding that Rule 13 trumps Rule4 I. and does not allow
parties to voluntariK dismiss counter claims without prejudice. As will be shown more fulK
below. Nu-Med maintains lhat it should be permitteti lo pursue its claims in the present
litigation for the following reasons:
1. The plain language of Rule 41 expressly allows for the voluntary dismissal of
counterclaims without prejudice: and
2. Nu-Med fully complied with the requirements of Rule 13 by initially pursuing
its claims as counterclaims in the prior litigation up until the point in time
when those claims ceased to be counterclaims because 4Life's claims against
Nu-Med had been entirely dismissed b\ the court on summary judgment.
A. Rule 41 Expressly Allows Eor The Voluntary
Dismissal Of Counterclaims, And States That Such
Dismissals Are Without Prejudice.
Nu-Med contends that the issue of whether a counter-claimant such as Nu-Med should
be permitted to voluntarily dismiss its counterclaims and then later re-file those same claims
is addressed by the plain language of Rule 41. There is no question that Rule 41(a)(2) of
both the I .'tah and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure creates a means whereby a party, with
court approval, can voluntarily dismiss its claims. Rule 41 also makes it clear that "|u]nless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice."
meaning that the party making the voluntary' dismissal can elect to re-file those claims at a
later date. Utah R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2)(h) (emphasis added).
The question in this case, however, is whether Rule 41 would also apply to
counterclaims, and specifically "compulsory' counterclaims" under Rule 13(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. In order to answer this question, the Court need search no further
than the plain language of Rule 41 itself which states "jt]he provisions of this rule apply to
the dismissal of any counterclaim." Utah R. Civ. P. 41(c) (emphasis added). It is important
to note that Rule 41(e) does not limit its application to certain types of counterclaims such
as non-compulsory counterclaims, but rather states in very clear language that the provisions
of Rule 41 apply to "the dismissal of any counterclaim." UL Thus, based on this plain
language from the rule itself, it is clear that Rule 41's mandate that, unless otherwise ordered
by the court, a voluntary dismissal made pursuant to Rule 41 is lo be deemed without
prejudice is also applicable to the voluntary' dismissal of "any" counterclaims, including
compulsory' counterclaims that were filed pursuant to Rule 13(a).
In the present case. Nu-Med's claims against 4Lifc fall squarely within the scope of
Rule 41. Nu-Med originally Filed its claims as counterclaims in the prior litigation between
Nu-Med and 4Life. When the trial judge in the prior litigation indicated that he was going
to dismiss 4Life's remaining claims against Nu-Med on summary judgment. Nu-Med notified
the court that it woulc be willing to voluntarily dismiss its counterclaims if summary
judgment was granted, making it clear, however, that it was only willing to dismiss those
counterclaims "without prejudice." and that it intended to continue to pursue the
counterclaims in the prior litigation si) long as any of 4Life's claims against Nu-Med were
allowed to go forward. (R. 89-l)0) In response to this representation, when the trial court
entered its written order granting Nu-Med's motion for summary judgment and dismissing
4I.ifVs remaining claims against Nu-Med, the trial court further ordered that Nu-Med's
counterclaims against 4Life be "voluntarily withdrawn and dismissed without prejudice."
(R. 92-94) (emphasis added).
Therefore, it was made very' clear in the proceedings and written order from the prior
litigation that Nu-Med's voluntary dismissal of its counterclaims against 4Life was to be
"without prejudice." thereby allowing Nu-Med the option of re-filing those claims in the
future. The actions of Nu-Med and the trial court in the prior litigation, including the
voluntary' dismissal of these counterclaims without prejudice, follow precisely" with the
procedure and results outlined in Rule 41.
If the Court were to accept 4Life"s argument that Rule 41 is not applicable to
compulsory" counterclaims under Rule 13. the Court would be required to either completely
ignore or nullify the language in Rule 41(e) which expressly extends the application of Rule
41 to "any counterclaim." Nu-Med does not believe there is any basis for the Court to nullify
the language of Rule 41 or modify its scope in any respect. As will be shown more fully
below. Nu-Med maintains that Rule 41 and Rule 13 are not in conflict, and that the
provisions of both rules can and should co-exist in harmony.
Based on the plain language of Rule 41. and specifically the express language
allowing parties to voluntarily dismiss, with court approval, "any" counterclaim without
prejudice. Nu-Med respectfully submits that the trial court erred in concluding that Nu-Med
was barred from re-filing its claims, and that it could not pursue those claims in the present
litigation.
B. Nu-Med Fully Complied With The Requirements Of
Rule 13 By Pursuing Its Claims As Counterclaims
Until 4Life's Claims Against Nu-Med No Longer
Existed.
Nu-Med acknowledges that its claims in the presenicase fell within the scope of Rule
13(a) as "compulsory jounterclaims'' in the prior litigation, and therefore, Nu-Med was
required to state its elai us as counterclaims in the prior litigation or would he forever barred
from attempting to ma<c the claims. However, Nu-Med is not barred from making those
claims now because Nu-Med fully complied with the requirements of Rule 13(a) by stating
its claims against 4Life as counterclaims in the prior litigation. It is undisputed that each of
Nu-Med's claims in the present litigation were previously staled as counterclaims in the prior
litigation, and that Nu-Med pursued those counterclaims in the prior litigation up until the
point in time when they ceased to be "counter" claims because all of 4Life's remaining
claims against Nu-Mcd were dismissed on summary judgment, it was only after 4I.ife's
claims against Nu-Med were dismissed that Nu-Med agreed to voluntarily dismiss its
counterclaims, with the express understanding that it woi.ld only do so if the dismissal was
without prejudice. Based on these undisputed facts. Nu-Med maintains that it fully complied
with the requirements of Rule 13(a). and therefore, it should not be barred from pursuing its
claims against 4I.ife.
It is important to note that while Rule 13(a) docs require that a party "state" its
compulsory counterclaims in a pleading in the same litigation where the underlying claims
against the counter-claimant are pending, there is nothing in Rule 13(a) which suggests that
14
a counter-claimant is required to pursue those counterclaims in that same case e\ en after the
underK ing claims against the counter-claimant ha\ c been resolved prior to trial by summarv
judgment or some other means. Instead, as shown aho\e. Rule 4 1 seems to expressIv permit
a counter-claimant in that situation to voluntarily dismiss its counterclaims without prejudice.
thereby reserving the option to re-tile those claims at a later date in a separate matter.
Nu-Med acknowledges that an entirely different situation would be presented if
41 ife's claims against Nu-Med in the prior litigation had remained pending and continued
on to trial. So long as 41.ife's claims against Nu-Mcd in the prior litigation had remained
pending. Nu-Med would have been compelled b> Rule 13(a) to pursue its claims against
4Life. it" at all. in that prior litigation. While Rule 41 would have allowed Nu-Med some
liberty to \ oluntarilv dismiss the claims without prejudice. Nu-Med's onh option for re-til ing
the elain^ would ha\ e been to do so as part of the same prior litigation since Nu-Med's
claims would ha\e continued to be compulsory" counterclaims m the face of4Life's ongoing
claims against Nu-Med. As soon as 4I.ife's claims against Nu-Mcd were fully dismissed.
howe\er. Rule 13 ceased to apply because Nu-Med's claims against 41.ife were no longer
coimtt'}x\iun\s. but were instead stand-alone claims.
This Court has recognized that the "purpose of rule 13(a) is to ensure that all relevant
claims arising out of a given transaction are litigated in the same action." Raile family '1 rust
\. Promax I)c\. Corp.. 24 P.3d 980. L)S3 (I'tah 2001 ). In other words, the purpose tor Rule
13ia) is to avoid a situation where one party's claims are proceeding in one court, while the
15
opposing party is pursuing claims against the same party which arise out of the same
"transaction or occurrence" in an entirely' separate court. That purpose has and is continuing
to be satisfied in this case. During the period where 41.ife had claims pending against Nu-
Med. counterclaims were tiled bv Nu-Med to ensure compliance with Rule 13(a). and all of
the claims were litigated in the "same action" that was pending in the t hiked States District
Court. While the forum aas now shifted, all of the claims between Nu-Med and 4L ife arising
out ol that same "transaction or occurrence" are continuing to be litigated in the "same
action." Most importantly' for purposes of Rule 13(a). there has never been a point in lime
in this litigation where 4Life"s claims against Nu-Mcd were running in one case, while Nu-
Med's claims against 4Life were proceeding in a different case.
With regards to t te issue of whether a parts can voluntarily dismiss and later re-file
claims pursuant to Rule 41 while still satisfying the requirements of Rule 13(a). the trial court
and the parlies have acknowledged that there is no prior case law from Utah that has
addressed this issue. (R. 51. 119. 267) In the proceedings below. -Hate cited cases from
other jurisdictions attempting to argue that courts in other states have concluded that parties
such as Nu-Mcd are barred by Rule 13(a) from voluntarily d ismissing counterclaims and then
attempting to re-tile those claims in separate actions. Sec Stern v. Whhlach & Co.. 631
N.E.2d 680 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993): Lcnihanv. Shumaker. No. 12814. 1987 WE 10916. 1987
Ohio App. LEXIS 6693 (Ohio Ct. App.. May 6. 1987); Clements v. Austin., 673 S.W.2d 867
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
16
None of the eases previously cited by 4I.ife. however, dealt with the issue presented
in this case. More specifically, none of those eases involved situations where a counter-
claimant attempted tovoluntarily' dismiss counterclaims after the underlying original claims
against the counter-claimant had all been dismissed or otherwise fullv resolved. Instead,
each ofthe cases relied on by 4Life( Stern. Lenihan. and Clements) involved situations where
the counter-claimants attempted to voluntarily' dismiss their counterclaims and re-file the
claims in separate actions, even though the underlying claims against the counter-claimants
remained pending in the original action, and in each ease, those underlying claims ultimately
went to trial after the counterclaims had been voluntarily dismissed.
Nu-Med acknowledges that under the scenarios presented in Stern. Lenihan. and
Clements. Rule 13(a) clearly- bars a counter-claimant from attempting to re-file their
counterclaims in a separate action since those claims would have continued to be compulsory'
counterclaims in the ongoing original litigation even after the counterclaims were voluntarily
dismissed. The key distinction in each case, however, is the fact that the original claims
against the counter-claimants were still pending at the time the counterclaims were
yoluntarily dismissed, and the original claims actually continued on in litigation and actually
went to trial. Obviously the above-stated purpose behind Rule 13(a) could only be satisfied
if the counterclaims were litigated, if at all. in the original eases that proceeded on to trial.
"1'hat is not the situation presented in this ease, however, where Nu-Med's counterclaims were
yoluntarilv dismissed onlv after 4Life's claims against Nu-Med had all been dismissed on
summary judgment, ant. thus, no claims between 4Life on Nu-Med continued on in litigation
until Nu-Med re-filed its claims in the present case.
While Stern, Lerihan, and Clements are all distinguishable from the present case. Nu-
Med has found a case from another jurisdiction which presents a situation more analogous
to the facts and issues of this case, and which clearly supports Nu-Med\s position that it
should be entitled to pursue its claims against 4Life in the present litigation. In Linn v.
NationsBank. 14 S.W.3d 500 {Ark. 2000), the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that,
under the facts presented in that case, a party should be permitted to pursue claims which had
previously been aliegec. as compulsory counterclaims in a prior action, but which had been
voluntarily dismissed after the original claim against the counter-claimants yvas resolved. In
Linn. NationsBank had initiated a foreclosure action against the Linns after the Linns had
discontinued payments on a construction loan, kf at 502. The Linns responded to the
foreclosure action by stating several counterclaims against NationsBank in the same action.
Id. A few months after the commencement of the action, the Linns filed for bankruptcy.
Several months later, ind in conjunction with the bankruptcy proceedings, an order was
entered which granted the foreclosure sought by NationsBank. Id. With the foreclosure
having been granted, the only remaining claims in the original action were the Linn's
counterclaims against NationsBank, kf At that point, the Linns made a motion pursuant to
Rule 41(a) for a voluntary dismissal of the counterclaims., and the trial granted the motion,
thereby dismissing the counterclaims without prejudice. Approximately, one year later, the
Linns filed a new lawsuit against NationsBank which included the same claims that had been
previously- voluntarily dismissed along with some neyv claims. Id. NationsBank responded
to the neyv layysuityvith amotion for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred
by Rule 13(a) as compulsory counterclaims which could not be re-filed in a new case, kf
at 502-03. The trial court agreed and granted NationsBank's motion for summary' judgment.
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court examined the relationship between Rule 13
and Rule 41.: and noted as follows:
. . . Rule 13(a) requires that any claim existing at the time oi'
filing a responsive pleading must be asserted in that responsive
pleading if it arises from the same transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. Rule 13 does
not. however, state whether a compulsory counterclaim must be
litigated in order to prevent a bar. In contrast, the plain
language in Rule 41 clear!) states that a defendant has the right
to proceed on his or her counterclaim although the plaintiffs
action may have been dismissed, and that the provisions ofRule
41 apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim.
Id. at 505 (emphasis in original). Based on its review of these two rules, the Arkansas
Supreme Court concluded that the Linns had properly' asserted their claims as counterclaims
in the earlier litigation, and that the Linns were also entitled to voluntarily' dismiss those
claims without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41. Id. Based on the facts presented, the court
reversed the grant of summary'judgment, and held that the Linns claims in the subsequent
: Rule 13(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, as set forth in Linn, appears to be
identical to the Utah rule. The Arkansas Rule 41 appears to be slightly different from the Utah
rule, but is substantively similar for purposes of this case in that the Arkansas rule likewise
provides for the \oluntary dismissal of claims without prejudice, and expressly states that it is
applicable to "any counterclaim". Linn 14 S.YV.Bd at 505.
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action were not barred by the compulsory counterclaim requirements of Rule 13(a).3 kf at
505-06.
Nu-Med contends that E[nn is the only authority presented by the parties which is
on point with the facts r.nd issues in the present case. The analysis and. conclusions of the
Arkansas Supreme Court clearly support Nu-Med's arguments that it should be entitled to
pursue those claims against 4Life which were previously voluntarily dismissed without
prejudice. The position folloyved in Linn allows the plain language of Rule 41 to function
in harmony with the requirements of Rule 13(a).
Since Nu-Med. Eke the counter-claimants in Linn, originally filed its claims as
counterclaims in the prior litigation, and pursued those counterclaims up until the time
that 4Life"s claims against Nu-Med yverc entirely resolved. Nu-Med should be deemed to
have fully satisfied the requirements of Rule 13(a). At the same time, because 4Life no
longer had any claims pending against Nu-Med at the time of the voluntary dismissal in
the prior litigation, it should be concluded that Nu-Med was entitled to the full benefits of
Rule 41, including the right to voluntarily dismiss its claims against 41.ife without
prejudice so long as the court approved the dismissal as ojcurred in th:s ease.
Nu-Med urges this Court to reject 4Life's attempts to create a conflict between
'fhe Arkansas court limited this holding to those claims which had previously been
asserted as counterclaims in the prior litigation. With respect lo neyv claims filed by the Linns
which had not been stated as counterclaims in the prior litigation, the court concluded that those
claims were barred by Rule 13(a), and therefore, upheld the summary- judgment on those claims.
Linn, 14 SAV.3d at 505-05.
Rules 13 and 41. As shown herein, these two rules can continue to coexist without
modification and in a way which allows the purposes of both rules to be fulfilled. This
case provides the perfect example of a situation where a party fully complied with Rule
13(a) requirements, and at the same time, should be entitled to take advantage of the plain
language of Rule 41 which grants the right to voluntarily dismiss certain claims without
prejudice, including "any counterclaim."
Based on the plain language of these rules and the facts presented in this case. Nu-
Med respectfully asks this Court to reyerse the grant of summary judgment entered below.
and to remand the ease so that Nu-Med can continue to pursue its claims against 4Life.
CONCLUSION
for the foregoing reasons. Nu-Med respectfully' asks this Court to reverse the trial
court's grant of summary judgment against Nu-Med. and to remand this case so that Nu-Med
can continue to pursue its claims against 4Life.
The is no Addendum required for this Brief under Rule 24(a)( 11) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
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